New Economic Models for Antibiotics R&D

A topic of particular importance is the effectiveness of new economic models to incentivize antibiotic R&D. Through the work of entities such as DRIVE-AB and the O’Neill Commission on AMR, we today have a fair idea of what new economic models are available for policy makers to incentivize antibiotics R&D. However, we know very little about the actual effectiveness of these new models. Being an empirical field, the issue of investigating the effectiveness of such models and understanding why some work while others don’t, or why some work under certain condition or in certain environments thus constitutes the research front on economic models in relation to antibiotic resistance. Moreover, while the various new economic models already proposed does much to address the challenges facing innovation in antibiotics, there are considerable gaps when it comes to, among other things, incentivizing the prudent use of new drugs to ensure their long-term efficacy. This research interest practically translates into developing and evaluating additional new economic models that not only incentivizes innovation, but also prudent use.

UU Researcher

Related published research

  1. Rahman, S., Lindahl, O., Morel, C. M., & Hollis, A. (2021). Market concentration of new antibiotic sales. The Journal of Antibiotics, 1-3.
  2. Morel, C., Lindahl, O., Harbarth, S., de Kraker, M., Edwards, S., & Hollis, A. (2020). ‘Industry incentives and antibiotic resistance: an introduction to the antibiotic susceptibility bonus.’ Journal of Antibiotics
  3. Morel, C., Özenci, V. & Lindahl, O. (2020) Lessons from COVID-19 on the role of the state and the market in providing early testing. Journal of Global Health
  4. Ciabuschi, F., Baraldi, E. & Lindahl, O. (2020). ‘Joining Forces to Prevent the Antibiotic Resistance Doomsday Scenario. The Rise of Antibiotics International Multisectorial Partnerships as a New Governance Model.’ Academy of Management Perspectives
  5. Baraldi, E., Ciabuschi, F., Lindahl, O., & Callegari, S. (2019) ‘Supporting innovation against the threat of antibiotic resistance: Exploring the impact of public incentives on firm performance and entrepreneurial orientation’, Journal of Business Research
  6. Baraldi, E., Lindahl, O., Savic, M., Findley, D., & Årdal, C., (2018). ‘Antibiotic Pipeline Coordinators’. The Journal of Law, Medicine, & Ethics
  7. Ciabuschi, F., & Lindahl, O. (2018). The Decline of Innovation in the Antibiotics Industry and the Global Threat of Antibiotic Resistance: When Entrepreneurial Efforts are Not Enough. In Entrepreneurship and the Industry Life Cycle (pp. 205-229). Springer, Cham.
  8. Okhravi, C., Callegari, S., McKeever, S., Kronlid, C., Baraldi, E., Lindahl, O., and Ciabuschi, F. (2018). ‘Simulating Market Entry Rewards for Antibiotics Development’, the Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics
Last modified: 2023-03-23